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A New Combination to Davy Jones' Locker:
Melee Over Marine Minerals
INTRODUCTION

Long the realm of the mythical Davy Jones, the ocean floor in
recent years has become the focal point of animated debate and will
soon suffer the onslaught of the world's technological army. The
prizes inspiring this quest down to the benthos are the seemingly
innocuous rocks and crusty layers which have accumulated over
millions of years. Known as manganese nodules, these conglomerations of minerals are necessitating decisions at the top levels of
industry,' finance' and government.3 The nickel, copper, manganese
and cobalt within the nodules give them value. Two questions are
representative of the concern over these minerals; (1) Who shall be
entitled to mine the nodules and thereby appropriate the riches of
the ocean floor?; and (2) under what conditions should mining
operations be carried out? The obstacle to a simple solution-the
nodules do not lay within the territorial jurisdiction of any sovereign.'
The existence of the manganese nodules is hardly a recent discovery.' The economic viability of seabed mining has not been recognized, however, until recent times, due to both a lack of need and
lack of technology. The next fifteen years should prove to be an
1. A. Statham, Testimony on S. 2053, "Deep Seabed Mineral Resources Act," to the
Subcommittee on Public Lands and Resources, Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
and Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,United States Senate, (Oct. 4,
1977) [hereinafter cited as Statham]; (on file with author) See also Serial No. 95-4, Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Oceanography and the Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
on H.R. 3350, H. R. 4582, H. R. 3652, H. R. 4922, H. R. 5624, H. R. 6846, and H. R. 6784, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1977) (statement of B. Gill Clements), [hereinafter cited as Serial No.
95-4]; Id. at 53 (statement of Marne Dubs on behalf of the American Mining Congress); Id.
at 228 (statement of Philip Hawkins).
2. Id. at 370 (testimony of J.W. Dawson, managing director, Undersea Projects Insurance
Brokers Ltd.); Id. at 169 (testimony of C.T. Houseman, vice president and technical director
of Chase Manhatten Bank).
3. Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1977 at 14, col. 2.
4. While isolated nodule deposits may exist within the two hundred mile zone, commercially exploitable deposits are found exclusively beyond the two hundred mile zones of any
significant land mass. The major nodule belt in the North Pacific lies between 0 and 20
degrees north latitude and 115 and 160 degrees west latititude. MINING CONG. J. 48 (Dec.
1976); Bus. INr'L 313, (Oct. 7, 1977) (weekly report); 123 CONG. Rc. #135 pt.HI, E 5301 (Aug.
5, 1977).
5. HMS Challenger, a British research ship, first scooped up manganese nodules from the
floor of the ocean over 100 years ago. Kennecott Copper Corp., Ocean Mining Fact Sheet,
Jan. 29, 1974 (news release) (on file); [hereinafter cited as Ocean Facts]. H.R. REP. No. 95588, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. pt. 1, 15 (1977) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. No. 588].
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explosive period for this fledgling industry,' if the substantial restraints inhibiting its growth are removed. The need for an alternative source of the minerals found in the nodules, and the willingness
of industry to develop the necessary technology were demonstrated
when Deepsea Ventures Inc. filed a claim with the Secretary of
State in November of 1974. Deepsea Ventures sought exclusive mining rights in an area covering approximately sixty thousand square
miles of the South Pacific known as the Clarion-Clipperton zone.
This claim changed the tenor of the debates from the abstract to the
concrete.7
The mere filing of a claim by a private corporation, however, has
not served as a sufficient impetus towards resolution of the differences between competing interests. The United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea has been negotiating a treaty concerning the
seabed, through four unproductive years and six sessions of endless
debate.' The session scheduled for March 1978 will be a "do or die"
effort according to Elliot Richardson, United States Ambassador to
the Law of the Sea Conference.9 Frustration over last year's conference has led the negotiators and the Carter Administration to question the wisdom of pursuing negotiations through this vehicle. 0
Frustration is also responsible for the Carter Administration's
change in posture reflected in its modified endorsement of domestic
legislation authorizing seabed mining by United States' citizens."
After presenting background information on the nature and location of seabed resources this article will examine the current status
of seabed mining along with the applicable principles of international law. Against this background, the structure and function of
the proposed International Seabed Authority and the nature of the
proposed domestic regime will be analyzed. 2
6. SEA TECHNOLOGY 23 (August 1976).
7. Biggs, Deepsea's Adventures: Grotius Revisited, 9 INT'L. LAw. 271 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Grotius Revisited].
8. Issues before the 32nd General Assembly of the United Nations 53 (1977-78) (on file).
9. Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1977 at 14, col. 2.
10. Id.; Wall St. J., July 21, 1977 at 4, col. 2; 123 CONG. REC. #124, S12621, 12622.
11. The Carter administration took the position that domestic legislation should be postponed pending the outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference in order to maintain consistency
between domestic legislation and any international agreements. Wall St. J., Oct. 5, 1977 at
14, col. 2. H.R. 3350 and S. 2053 are the two bills which have been given the most serious
consideration and enjoy the broadest support within Congress.
12. The legislation before Congress is supported by such strange bedfellows as the industrialists and the environmentalists. The environmentalists favor immediate legislation in
recognition of imminent danger to the living resources of the ocean which could result from
mining in the absence of an international agreement. R.A. FRANK, DEEPSEA MINING AND THE
ENVIRONMENT (1976).
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THE NATURE OF MANGANESE NODULES

For economic purposes, many states have asserted territorial jurisdiction over the sea, two hundred miles from their shores. These
areas, known as two hundred mile zones, account for thirty seven
percent of the ocean surface. 3 Manganese nodules lie outside the
limits of any sovereignty, including the two hundred mile zone. 4
This greatly restricts the potential area of the necessarily massive
mining operations. Coupled with this limitation on the potential
mining area is the lack of uniformity of nodule distribution, 5 as well
as differences in value of the individual nodules." The area of highest concentration, the Clarion-Clipperton zone, has already been
claimed by a mining company. 7 Only thirteen percent of the samples from outside that zone have mineral concentrations sufficient
to justify commercial exploitation.' 8
A major distinction between nodules and other sea resources is
the regeneration period. Nodules form by means of inorganic chemical precipitation;" outer layers grow from one to seven millimeters
in one million years. 0 Thus, they are essentially a non-renewable
resource. Estimates of the world wide deposits vary from hundreds
of millions to trillions of tons of ore.2' The accelerating demand for
natural resources and these inherent limitations of nodule mining
have rendered the traditional notion of the Law of the Sea an anachronism.
13. H.R. REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 15.
14. W. Wooster, Some Implications of Ocean Research, 4 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L. L. 39, 47
(1977).
15. MINING CONG. J. 48 (Dec. 1976): SEA TECHNOLOGY 23, 24 (Aug. 1976).
16. Although nodules are found in all of the oceans, those in the North Pacific generally
have a higher concentration of the minerals vital to the economic success of seabed mining.
Of the four basic minerals found within the nodules manganese, copper, nickel, and cobalt it
is generally agreed that the ore should have a concentration of2.2% of the three latter minerals
for commercial purposes. SEA. TECHNOLOGY 23, 24 (Aut. 1976).
17. MINING CONG. J. 46 (Dec. 1976); SEA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 15; see also Grotius
Revisited, supra note 7, at 271-72.
18. SEA TECHNOLOGY, supra note 15, at 24. Typical concentrations within the nodules vary
from 0.7-1.5% copper, 0.8-1.6% nickel, and traces of cobalt. Ocean Facts, supra note 5. Other
estimates place concentrations at 24.2% manganese, 14% iron, 1% nickel, 0.5% copper, 0.35%
cobalt with traces of other elements including; silicon, aluminum, sodium, calcium, magnesium, potassium, itianium, barium, lead, strontium, zirconium, vanadium, molybdenum,
zinc, boroh, yttrium, lanthanum, ytterbium, chromium, gallium, scandium, and silver. H.R.
REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 15; MINING CONG. J. 38 (Nov. 1973).
19. Ocean Facts, supra note 5, at 2.
20. SEA TECHNOLOGY 23 (Aug. 1976).
21. Id.; Ocean Facts, supra note 5, at 1; H.R. REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 15, 16: 123
CONG. REC. #135, pt. II, S13980 (Aug. 5, 1977).
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STATUS OF THE LAW OF THE SEA

1958 Convention
While the use of the sea's resources is an old as man, large scale
exploitation is a recent phenomenon. Technological change necessitates the development of more sophisticated bases to guide exploitation. The United Nations has looked to three documents to provide
such guidance: the 1958 Convention on the High Seas (Convention), 22 Resolution 2749,23 and the Informal Composite Negotiating
24
Text.
The Convention, the only treaty dealing specifically with such
resource problems, defines the term "high seas" as all parts of the
sea which are not located within the territorial waters of any state.2
Presumably, this definition includes the seabed, an integral part of
the sea. The Convention mandates that no state shall exercise sovereignty ever any part of the high seas. These sections support the
inference that no state may exercise sovereignty over the resources
of the seabed. Explicitly recognized "Freedoms of the High Seas"
include: navigation, fishing, over-flight, and laying of pipes and
cables.2 6 Any exercise of those freedoms must respect the rights of
27
others to those same freedoms.
Proponents of seabed mining assert a right to mine as an exercise
of a freedom of the high seas. Although this right is not specifically
enumerated, the Convention does authorize the exercise of freedoms
"recognized by the general principles of international law. 2 1 Proponents of mining analogize between fishing and mining, asserting
that there is no significant difference between the two types of exploitation. This argument, however, ignores the fact that fishing is
essentially a non-destructive use of the seas' resources while mining
is not. The fish regenerate rapidly; nodules do not. More importantly, actions by the nations of the world have shown that mining
is not a recognized freedom. These actions, two United Nations
resolutions, 29 effectively assert that no person has a right to mine the
22. The Law of the Sea: Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. 5200 (entered into force for the United States on Sept. 30, 1962) [hereinafter cited
as Convention].
23. Declaration of Principles Governing the Use of the Seabed, A/Res./2749, 25 U.N. Doc.
A/C.1/544 (1970).
24. A/Conf. 62/W.P. 10 (1977).
25. Convention, supra note 22, art. I, 13 U.S.T. 2314, T.I.A.S. 5201.
26. Id., art. 1H,13 U.S.T. 2314, T.I.A.S. 5201.
27. Id., art. 11,par. 1-4, 13 U.S.T. 2314, T.I.A.S. 5201.
28. Id.
29. Declaration of Principles Governing the Use of the Sea-Bed, A/Res./2749, (XXV)2,
U.N. Doc. A/C.1/544 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Res. 2749]. Besides the assertion that the
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resources of the high seas, since that right is possessed by the international community as a whole.
The real problem with the Convention lies in its vagueness. It fails
to clearly articulate criteria for identifying other generally recognized freedoms, and does not specifically treat seabed mining. The
Convention's insufficient definition of freedoms and restraints
greatly hinders enforcement of those restraints by our domestic
courtsY' Sine the treaty is too vague to be enforced as domestic law,
it is difficult to determine the effect, if any, it will have up on the
actions of those private entities otherwise subject to the law of the
United States. Notwithstanding these deficiencies, the Convention
did lay foundations which must control any exploitation in the absence of a new treaty.
RESOLUTION

2749-THE

COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND

The second source of guidance for resource exploitation, Resolution 2749, was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1970, with the United States voting for that adoption.3 The Resolution declares "that the resources of the seabed are the common
heritage of mankind, 3 that the seabed shall not be subject to appropriation by any means, states or persons, and that no state shall
exercise soverign rights over any part. ' 33 In addition to this expression of the world community's opinion as to the legal nature of the
seabed resources, the Resolution also embodies a commitment that
all activities on the seabed shall be governed by an international
regime4 for the benefit of mankind.3 5 Much of the debate over the
seabed centers upon the legal effect of this Resolution on the actions
of United States citizens.
Effect of Resolution 2749 on the United States and Its Citizens
An international agreement may impose an obligation on a state
party without attaining the status of domestic law. Agreements that
qualify as domestic law can be enforced against private parties in
domestic courts. If an agreement is not domestic law, obligations are
imposed only on the state parties, not on their nationals directly.
seabed is the common heritage of mankind, the General Assembly had passed a resolution
in the prior year calling for a moratorium on all seabed mining activities. A/Res./2574,
(XXIV) U.N. Doc. A/C.1/355 (1969).
30. Cf. Biggs, Deepsea's Adventures: Grotius Revisited-A Rejoinder, 10 INT'L LAW. 314
(1976).
31. Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 182.
32. Res. 2749 supra note 29, at 1, par. 1.
33. Id. at 2, par. 2.
34. Id. at 2, par. 4.
35. Id. at 2, par. 7.
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The intended effect is determined by the interpretation of the
agreement."
With reference to the domestic law of the United States, Resolution 2749 is practically, if not legally, void. It has never been formally ratified. Even though there is authority for the contention
that an executive agreement can operate as domestic law without
the advice of the Senate,37 the Carter Administration maintains that
private companies are free to mine despite the Resolution.3" Therefore, it is unlikely that the Resolution, unsupported by the executive
branch and not formally embodied in a treaty, will ever be enforced
against United States nationals.
Whether the Resolution is an international agreement that imposes obligations upon the United States may be determined by a
textual interpretation of the instrument. The threshold issue in such
interpretation is whether the Resolution was intended to effect legal
relations, or whether it was merely a "declaration of standards of
achievement. 3 9 The title, "Declaration of Principles Governing the
Seabed," speaks of general standards rather than concrete relationships. Notwithstanding the title, certain provisions of the Resolution support the proposition that it was intended to have a legal
effect. The preamble contains the following introductory phrase:
"Recognizing that the existing legal regime of the high seas does not
provide substantive rules for regulating the exploration of the afore.. "0 In the operasaid area and the exploitation of its resources.
tive portion it is declared:
36. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW-2D THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES §149 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. Section 149 of the Restatement provides:
The extent to which an international agreement creates, changes, or defines relationships under international law is determined in case of doubt by the interpretation of the agreement. The primary object of interpretation is to ascertain the
meaning intended by the parties for the terms in which the agreement is expressed,
having regard to the context in which they occur and the circumstances under
which the agreement was made. This meaning is determined in the light of all
relevant factors.
One such circumstance may have been the absence of any perceived need to more fully define
those relationships at that time. It could be decided that the objective manifestations of the
words coincided with Resolution 2749. Id. Comment a states, "Objective manifestations of
intention. . .not subjective intention. . govern the meaning to be given. The interpretation. . .is not limited by certain contract doctrines that tend to restrict the introduction of
certain types of evidence."
37. Reid v. Covert 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
38. Wall St. J, Oct. 5, 1977 at 14, col. 2: Bus. INT'L 313 (Oct. 7, 1977).
39. The parties to the agreement may be states or international organizations. The determinative factor is the intent to alter or define the relations between the parties under international law. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, §115 comment a.
40. Res. 2749, supra note 29.
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The seabed . . . as well as the resources are the common heritage
of mankind. . . .The area shall not be subject to appropriation
by any means . . .no State shall claim or exercise . . . sovereign
rights. . . .No State or person shall claim. . . rights. . . incompatible with the international regime. . .. All activities regarding
the exploration and exploitation . . .shall be governed by the

international regime.'
The preamble, which recognizes the deficiencies of current instruments embodying substantive law, coupled with the language of the
operative provisions, indicate that the instrument was intended to
create binding legal relationships among the state parties. A notable
exception to this conclusion is the reference in the operative portion
to the common heritage of mankind. That provision is phrased in
declaratory rather than mandatory language.
Another section that reflects an intent to effect legal relations
states: "Nothing in here shall affect: (a) The legal status of the
waters superadjacent to the area or that of the air space above the
waters; (b) The rights of coastal states with respect to measures to
prevent, mitigate, or eliminate grave and imminent danger to their
coastline. ..'"I The inference is clear that while those particular
legal relations were not intended to be affected, others were, The
disclaimer concerns legal relations (the legal status of the air space
above the high seas, and of the waters adjacent to the high seas)
outside the scope of the subject matter of the Resolution (exploitation of the resources of the seabed). By negative implication, failure
to provide a similar disclaimer for the subject matter of the Resolution leads to the inescapable conclusion that the drafters did intend
to effect legal relations concerning exploitation of seabed resources.
One obstacle to the Resolution's effectiveness is the assertion that
the United Nations representatives voting for the Resolution had no
authority to bind the United States to an agreement. This claim
lacks merit. A State may be bound by an international agreement
made by one having the authority to represent it in its foreign affairs, even though that party lacks the specific authority to make
the agreement, provided the agreement does not require ratification, and the other parties to the agreement do not know of the lack
of actual authority. 3 Therefore, this agreement made by a United
Nations representative may be binding on the United States, since
any person acting under authority delegated by the president has
41. Id. at 2, par. 1-3.
42. Id. at 4, par. 13.
43. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, §123(1), (2)(a), (b), (c), (d). An oral agreement may be
binding Id. §115(a), comment c.
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the power to make an international agreement."
Furthermore, a claim that the United States would never assent
to an agreement curtailing mining rights, prior to the establishment
of an international authority, cannot be accorded much deference.
Objective manifestations determine the interpretation of an international agreement, not subjective intentions." Thus, the intent of
the United States in voting for the Resolution is irrelevant. It is
appropriate to refer to the opinion of the majority of the international community in determining the objective manifestations of
the Resolution. While the good faith of that part of the international
community known as the "Group of 77"" is open to question, it is
indisputable that they interpret the Resolution as imposing a binding obligation to refrain from mining. That group now constitutes a
majority of the international community. Thus, it appears that the
Resolution is binding on the United States, and the duty to give
effect to its terms47 dictates United States' inhibition and restraint
of its nationals, unless those nationals can point to some superior
principle of international law supporting the right to mine. 8
RES NULLIUS

The foundation of international law is the sharing, by nations, of
principles determined by the common opinion of mankind. 9 One of
0 is cited by mining proponents
these principles, res nullius,1
to support the right to mine. According to that principle, property belonging to no one may be taken up by anyone, and by virtue of possession, will be considered the property of the possessor.5' Fish on the
44. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, §13i. That authority is subject to limitations not applicable here.
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, §146 and comment a.
46. "The Group of 77" is a loosely knit organization of about 110 underdeveloped countries who perceive their interests with regard to seabed mining as sufficiently identical to
warrant a collective stand against mining by any entity other than an international authority.
123 CONG. REc. #125,S12675 (July 22, 1977).
47. RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, §138, comment a.
48. See: Biggs, Deepsea'sAdventures: Grotius Revisited - A Rejoinder, 10 INT'L LAW. 312
(1976); see also: J. CASTENEDA, LEGAL EFFEcT OF U.N. RESOLUTIONS (1969).
Cf. 123 CONG. REc. #123, S12482, (July 20, 1977) (address by Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan, Senate advisor to the Law of the Sea Conference); Honorable John B. Breaux
(Chairman of House Subcommittee on Oceanography), Statement before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce Science and Transportation-JointHearings on Seabed Mining, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2,3 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Breaux]; Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 51, 52
(testimony of Senator Lee Metcalf).
49. Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 182-83 (statement of John Quigley, professor of
international law, Ohio State University).
50. "the thing of no one."
51. 11 S. THORNE, BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND, 41 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as BRACTON].
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high seas are a common example of res nullius. Mining proponents
analogize the resources of the seabed to fish in the sea, and assert
there is no legally significant difference between the two-both
should be considered res nullius.
However, it is questionable whether res nullius was ever a proper
characterization of the resources of the high seas. Res communes52
is another principle that may be a more correct conceptualization.
Things which are res communes, such as the air, sea, and seashore,
can never be owned by anyone;5" they are perpetually and indivisably common property. Since the 1958 Convention includes the
seabed within its definition of the "high seas," and as the peculiar
composition of the nodules makes them an integral part of the
seabed, 54 it may be more appropriate to consider the mineral resources of the sea as res communes.
An overall objection to this analysis is that the legitimacy of
arguing about mining rights in terms of ancient Roman principles
is highly debatable. These principles were developed at a time when
relationships between people and nations were much less complex.
There was no concern about depletion of the world's resources. The
connection between these ancient principles and the current issues
involved in resource exploitation is tenuous at best.
Furthermore, because the applicability of res nullius depends
upon the common opinion of mankind, 55 that concept cannot effectively support a right to mine, since the nations of the world have
indicated that they do not recognize the right of anyone to reduce
the nodules to possession and thereby establish title. 6 Unfortunately, the world community has not yet indicated in what manner
the nodules should be commercially exploited. This perplexing
question is of primary concern to the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), wherein the nations of
the world are negotiating a comprehensive treaty to guide all as57
pects of mankind's utilization of the sea.
52.
53.

"a common thing; a thing of the universe."
A.M. PICHARD, LEAGE'S ROMAN PRIVATE LAW, 154 (3d ed. 1961). [hereinafter cited as

PRICHARD].

54. See notes 25 and 26 supra.
55. Bracton, supra note 51 at 41.
56. Resolution 2749 was adopted by a vote of 108-0. This unanimous support strongly
implies a recognition that the Resolution, if not binding as an international agreement,
qualifies as a customary principle of international law. The moratorium Resolution
A/Res./2574(XXIV), which advocated an immediate halt to all seabed activities, may similarly qualify as a recognized principle of international law, although the level of support
makes this more doubtful (68 yea-28 nay). See Grotius Revisited, supra note 7, at 279; Serial
No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 182-83, 185-88 (statement of J. Quigley and dialogue with Breaux).
57. 123 CONG. REC. #125,S12676, co. 1, 2, 3.; #135 pt.HI, E5302 (Aug. 5, 1977).
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AND THE INFORMAL COMPOSITE NEGOTIATING TEXT

The third potential source of guidance for resource exploitation,
the Informal Composite Negotiating Text (ICNT) has been the center of controversy at UNCLOS III. This treaty-draft which attempts
to implement the commitment to an international regime embodied
in Resolution 2749, was prepared by Paul Engo, chief representative
from the African Cameroon Republic and Chairman of Committee
1.58 While the United States did not find the former text completely
acceptable, the revised text submitted by Engo deleted "key" compromise provisions and was prepared under secretive circumstances
adding fuel to the fires of suspicion. 9 The secret preparation, alone,
offers no basis for the righteous indignation of the United States,
which a year earlier participated in secret negotiations resulting in
a draft favorable to the United States."°
InternationalSeabed Authority- World Government Prototype
The ICNT 6 ' provides for the establishment of an International
Seabed Authority (ISA) of which all state parties are members."2
The ISA is to consist of three principal organs-an Assembly, a
Council, and a Secretariat." A distinct organ, the Enterprise, is to
carry out directly all activities in the "Area." 4 The "Area" is defined as the seabed, including the subsoil, beyond the limits of any
national jurisdiction. 5 Provision is also made for a Law of the Sea
Tribunal, and its sub-body, the Seabed Disputes Chamber. 6
The Assembly, as supreme organ of the ISA, is the policy-making
body. It operates under majority rule with a two-thirds majority
required for substantive questions. 7 The policy which it formulates
will be implemented by the Council. The thirty-six member Council
is to be composed of four members from the countries making the
greatest contribution to seabed exploitation, four from the major
58. Law of the Sea Treaty-Talk, Talk, and More Talk, NATIONAL JOURNAL 133 (Aug. 27,
1977), [hereinafter cited as Law of the Sea-Talk].
59. 123 CONG. REC. #135 pt.nI (Aug. 5, 1977) E5301; 123 CONG. REC. #124, S12621, 12622
(July 21, 1977).
60. 123 CONG. REC. #135 pt.1II, E5301 (Aug. 5, 1977); Law of the Sea-Talk, supra note 58,
at 1345.
61. Informal Composite Negotiating Text (Law of the Sea Treaty), A/Conf. 62/W.P.
10(1977) [hereinafter ICNT]. The text was the product of the sixth session of the third Law
of the Sea Conference held in New York from May 23-July 15, 1977.
62. Id.at 27, §5, art. 154.
63. Id.art. 156(1).
art. 156(2).
64. Id.,
65. ICNT,supra note 61, at 6, art.1 (1).
66. Id. at 58-59, Annex V.
67. Id. at 28, §5, art. 157.
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importers of nodule metals, four from the exporters, six from developing countries, and eighteen based on geographic distribution. 8
None of the members are permanent.
The Council will implement policy through directives to the Enterprise, which will directly supervise activities in the Area."9 The
Enterprise will be controlled by a Director--General and a Governing
Board, both appointed by the Assembly."
Concern has been expressed that the structure of the ISA will
enable the developing countries to gain control at the expense of
developed countries.7 1 An underlying fear is that the ISA will provide a working model for the creation of a world government.7 2 The
ISA is structured as a government, and lacks only an enforcement
organ.73 Moreover it will have a steady source of revenue once mining begins.7" Financial independence could be achieved even earlier
through the exercise of its borrowing power.75 The ICNT also provides that the ISA shall enjoy governmental immunity, subject to
abrogation only by waiver.7 6 Its only deficiency, lack of parties to be
governed, is likely to be cured by the lure of ocean riches. A functional international government would necessitate major policy
shifts by corporations and nations seeking the minerals under its
control.
FUNCTIONS AND DYSFUNCTIONS OF THE

ISA

Critics of the ISA focus on the potential effect which its operation
could have on the activities of businesses and nations who perceive
the seabed as a means of allevating strategic and economic problems. The most pervasive criticism is the lack of sufficient assurances that private entities will be permitted to mine for their own
68.
69.
70.

Id., at 29, art. 159 1(a)-(e).
Id. at 29, §5, art. 160; Id. at 32, § 5, art. 169.
Id. at 8, § 5, art. 158 2 (IV).
71. 123 CONG. REC. #123, S12483 (July 20, 1977); 123 CONG. REC. #135 pt.II, S13981 (Aug.
5, 1977); 123 CONG. REC. #124, S12623 (July 21, 1977).
72. Law of the Sea-Talk, supra note 58, at 1338; Galey, From Caracas, to Geneva, to New
York: The InternationalSeabed Authority as Creatorof Grants [hereinafter: Galey] 4 OCEAN
DEV. & INT'L LAW 172 (1977). See generally Borgese, The New International Economic Order
and the Law of the Sea, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 584-96 (1977).
73. Cf. ICNT, supra note 61, at 26, §4, art. 151(4), (5).
74. Id. at 25, §4, art. 150(1)(c). Activities in the area are to be carried out so as to ensure
transfer of revenues to the Authority. Id. at 32, § 5, art. 170(2); Id. at 51, Annex R, par. 7(i).
75. Id. at 33, § 5, art. 174. The power of the Enterprise to issue bonds is contingent upon
the consent of the member country in whose market the bonds will be sold. Id. at 56, Annex
III, par. 10(c)(i).
76. The property and assets of the Enterprise are to be free from search and seizure.
ICNT, supra note 61, at 33, §5, art. 178, 179.
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account." A key provision restricting access provides that all resources are vested in mankind as a whole, and that the minerals
derived from the :esources are alienable only as provided in the
treaty."
The text of the proposed treaty establishes stringent conditions
to be met by private parties who seek to mine the seabed. Those
private parties must be sponsored by a state party, and must agree
to act in association with the ISA.7 9 Thus, their mining operations
would never be entirely independent. The relationship between the
private entity and the ISA would be set forth in a contract. The
immediate parties to the contract would be the private party and
the Enterprise. All contracts would be drawn to ensure that the ISA,
through the Enterprise, will have ultimate control at all stages of
the operation.! ° This does not necessarily mean that the ISA will be
actively directing all operations, but that it at least will have the
ability to halt any operation and to specify the conditions under
which the operations can continue.
Companies consenting to such stringent control by the ISA are
not assured of access to the minerals. Any party wishing to contract
with the ISA, as all miners must, will be required to submit an
application." The ISA will then choose those applicants with whom
it will contract. In selecting applicants the ISA may give preference
to those private entities willing to work directly with the Enterprise
in a joint venture in which developing countries would also directly
participate."2 Thus, the potential scope of independent operations is
severely limited. Many private companies would not be willing to
mine under such a joint venture structure and that unwillingness
would force them to an unfavorable position among the applicants
seeking contracts. These limitations on access could be the breaking
point of the negotiations, for they strike at the heart of the national
interest in ocean mining.
National Interest in Access to Nodules
The prospect of a guaranteed supply of the metals contained in
the manganese nodules was the original stimulus of governmental
action.13 The minerals have strategic importance to the United
77.
1977);
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

123 CONG. REc. #125, S12676 (July 22, 1977); 123 CONG. REc. #124, S12622 (July 21,
123 CONG. REC. #123, S12483 (July 20, 1977); Wall St. J., July 21, 1977, at 4, col. 2.
ICNT, supra note 61, at 23, § 2, art. 137(2).
Id. at 26, §4, art. 151(2)(ii).
ICNT, supra note 61, at 50, Annex 11, par. (3)(c)(ii) (4)(c)(iii).
Id. at 50, Annex II, par. (5).
Id.,,par. (g), (i), (j) (iii).
Ely, Deep Seabed Minerals: Congress Steams to the Rescue, 40 INT'L LAW. 538 (1976);
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States. Their strategic value is directly related to the high level of
importation of nodule metals. The United States imports approximately 95-100% of its manganese, 98-100% of its cobalt, 71-74% of
its nickel, and 15-18% of its copper. 4 The fact that most of the free
world's supply of these minerals is controlled by a few nations further intensifies the strategic significance of the nodules."5 These
minerals are of critical importance to the heavy industries of this
country: manganese, for its use in the removal of impurities during
steel production, cobalt, for the production of alloys used by the
aerospace industry, copper, for the electrical industry. Nickel is also
used by the aerospace industry, as well as hundreds of other industries, as a necessary element in the production of stainless steel. 6
Of even greater significance than strategic considerations is the
contribution which seabed mining may make in alleviating the
United States' current deficit in the balance of payments.8 7 Estimates of the annual trade deficit attributable to importation of
nodule metals range from $500,000,000 to $1,500,000,000.8 Optimistic proponents believe that this deficit could be eliminated within
twenty years of full-scale seabed mining. However, the accrual of
such benefits depends upon the development and utilization of the
necessary technology.
Transfer of Technology
The ICNT allows the ISA to require a transfer of technology to
itself and developing countries as a precondition to contracting with
the ISA.9 I This provision is considered vital by developing countries,
expected to be technologically inferior for twenty to thirty years.'
This technological deficiency has engendered fears that the Assembly would institute discriminatory policies in an attempt to stay
full-scale development until those countries gain the necessary techBreaux, supra note 48, at 3; 123 CONG. REc. #124, S12482 (July 20, 1977).
84. H.R. REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 17-18; Ocean Facts, supra note 5, at 1; Grotius
Revisited, supra note 7, at 227.
85. See United States Policies with Respect to High Seas Fisheries and the Deep SeabedA Study in Contrasts, 9 NAT. RESOURCE LAW 639 (1976) [hereinafter cited as United States
Policies]. That author estimates that 99% of the free world's manganese is controlled by 5
nations, 66% of the nickel by 2 nations, 99% of the cobalt by 5 nations, and 75% of the copper
by 5 nations.
86. H.R. REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 17.
87. Ocean Facts, supra note 5, at 1.
88. Id. at 1; H.R. REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 19.
89. Law of the Sea-Talk, supra note 58, at 1339; United States Policies, supra note 85, at
639.
90. 123 CONG. REC. #124, S12622; Law of the Sea-Talk, supra note 58, at 1342.
91. Galey, supra note 72, at 174.
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nological expertise. 2

The harshest requirements regarding transfer of technology are
directed towards l rivate entities possessing the needed technology,
who will actually develop the resources. Every applicant must agree
to negotiate for the licensing of the technology actually used."
Where two applicants compete for a contract involving the same
Area, the private entity who offers the best technological deal to the
ISA will probably be selected. 4 The contractor will also be required
to design and implement training programs for the personnel of the
ISA and developing countries, and must allow their actual participation in all activities in the Area." The contractor may withhold
proprietary equipment designs. However, the broad discretion of the
ISA in granting contracts may render that protection a nullity."
Requiring transfer of technology does not provide incentive for the
development of sophisticated, as opposed to basic, mining systems.
The right to the exclusive use of one's own research and development has traditionally provided the greatest impetus for improving
technology. It is not always possible to assess from an empirical
basis the real cost or value of any improvement until there has been
a period of exclusive use. The potential for industrial espionage is
accentuated by the training programs for "outsiders," particularly
in ocean mining where it is impossible to develop a system without
field-testing the equipment. 7 These restrictions have also inhibited
companies from making the large investment in prototype operations, which will provide the data upon which final decisions will be
based.9 8 These factors have prevented companies from projecting
92. Barkenbus, Seabed Negotiations: The Failure of United States Policy, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. #4 633 (1977). But Cf. ICNT, supra note 61, at 25-26, § 4, art. 150 l(g), 2(g).
93. Id. at 50, Annex 11. par. 4(c)(ii).
94. Id. at 50-51, Annex II, par. 5(g), (i), (j).
95. ICNT, supra note 61, at 53, Annex Il par. 9.
96. Id. par. 8.
97. MINING CONG. J. 46, 47 (Dec. 1976). The U.S. companies have all chosen an air-lift
method whereby a dredging head scrapes the nodules from the ocean floor and feeds them to
a nearly vertical pipe through which they are transported up to the ship with air suction. The
dredge head may be either towed or self-propelled. Other methods include a simple
"dragline" method, which is nothing more than a large bucket dragged across the ocean floor.
The Japanese continuous bucket method is substantially the same with more buckets. R.A.
FRANK, DEEPSEA MINING AND THE ENVIRONMENT, 8 (1976). Ocean Facts, supra note 5, at 3.
The basic costs of transportation to processing facilities are known. The actual processing
costs while not known are estimated to be about 50% of the cost of producing an equivalent
amount of nickel from a laterite (land-based) deposit. The costs of the feedstock is the major
remaining variable. Ocean Mining Systems, MINING CONG. J. 6 (Sept. 1976) [hereinafter
cited as Ocean Mining Systems].
98. Current expenditures of those companies interested in mining as members of consortia
have ranged from 10 to more than 20 million dollars each. The next step of prototype mining
would require an investment of from 50 to 100 million dollars to be increased to 300 to 500
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returns on their investment and have already delayed ocean mining
a number of years.
Cost, Feasibilityand Contingencies
A related deficiency in the ICNT is its failure to clearly set forth
the financial contribution to be required of companies mining in the
Area. The text provides that the financial contribution will be negotiated between the contractor and the ISA,19 with an assurance of
equality in contract terms.10 0 The financial obligation of the contractor will be computed using three factors: an annual royalty, a production charge (both of which should be uniform for all contractors),
and a share of the net proceeds. 0' The determination of the proceeds
of the operation is to include an allowance for development costs. 02
Fears concerning the amount of profits which the ISA may seek
stem from a recognition that developing countries consider the
ocean a principal tool for restructuring the world's economy.'03 Such
conceptions crystalize the conflict between the goals of developing
countries and the perceived needs of the entrepenuers and financiers
of ocean mining.
Another provision of the ICNT imposes volume restrictions on
production. 04 Production for the first seven years will be limited to
the projected growth of the world nickel market; thereafter, it is not
to exceed sixty percent of the projected growth of that market.0 5
The purpose of these limits is not to avoid resource depletion. The
ICNT, does not deal with this potential problem. Rather, the limitations on production are intended to provide economic protection
for developing countries who depend upon the exportation of the
minerals found in the nodules. 06
million dollars at the initiation of "pilot" activities. Estimates of the total investment by four
consortia in technological development are as high as 1.5 billion dollars. See 123 CONG. REC.
#121, E4589 (July 18, 1977). Statham, supra note 1, at 16; Welling, Next Step in Ocean
Mining-Large Scale Test, MINING CONG. J., 47, (Nov. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Welling].
99. ICNT, supra note 61, at 50, Annex II, par. 5(d) (ii).
100. Id. at 51, Annex II, par. 7 (a) (ii) (iii), (iv).
101. Id. par. 7(c) (i).
102. Id. at 51-52, Annex II, par. 7(d).
103. Galey, supra note 72, at 172-73; The New InternationalEconomic Orderand the Law
of the Sea, supra note 72, at 584-86.
104. 123 CONG. REc. #124, S12622 (July 21, 1977); 123 CONG. lbc. #125, S12676 (July 22,
1977); Law of the Sea-Talk, supra note 58, at 1342.
105. ICNT, supra note 61, at 25, §4, art. 150(B)(i).
106. In the systems of compensation established for the developing countries whose economies are adversely affected, it is not a requirement that a beneficiary state be a party to
the treaty. Practically, this should present little inconsistency as the developing countries,
which have already developed mining industries, are likely to be anxious to participate in
the activities of the ISA, due to beneficial effects which that participation may bring to the
economy. ICNT, supra note 61, at 25, § 4, art. 150(g).
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These production restrictions are troublesome. The limitations
may hinder the development of the seabed since they deprive the
mining companies Of the data needed to compute feasibility figures.
Artificial restrictions on supply will raise prices directly and indirectly due to the inability of the mining interests to achieve maximum utilization of their equipment and a proportional return on
their investment. One industry spokesman asserts that ocean mining will not be cost competitive with land-based mining for many
years, in the absence of artificial supports. 7 Artificial constraints
increase this inability to compete and diminish the desirability of
ocean mining for those with land-based alternatives. The minimum
amount of nodule ore which can be brought to the surface at one
site, while retaining necessary profitability, is estimated to be from
1,500,000 to 4,250,000 metric tons per year. 08 Moreover, this figure
does not reflect processing costs.0 9 These costs are a vital consideration for they represent one half of the total cost of nodule mining."'
The danger of production limitations lies not in cost-prohibition,
but in making mining insufficiently profitable to attract investment.
THE REASSESSMENT CLAUSE AND GRANDFATHER RIGHTS

A textual provision odious to investors is the reassessment clause.
It provides for reassessment of the international regime within
twenty five years. At that time, unless an agreement to the contrary
is reached, access to the seabed will become the exclusive right of
the Enterprise and any partners whom it may seek out for a joint
venture."' The exclusivity, not limited to nodule mining, would
encompass any exploitation carried out within the Area. This provision forces the mining companies to compute costs on a maximum
utilization period of twenty five years. Financing, protected by the
continuity of operations, could extend no longer. Considering the
time already spent negotiating the ICNT, the four years of conferences and the seven years since Resolution 2749, and the crucial
issues still unresolved, it is naive to believe an agreement can be
reached within an acceptable period of time. Barring all other objections, it is a tremendous waste of time to reassess these complex
issues in just two decades.
107. Statham, supra note 1, at 3-4.
108. The actual estimates are from 1 to 3 million dry tons a year, but as the nodules are
from 30-40% water, the tonnage required would be that indicated in the text. Welling, supra
note 98, at 46.
109. Id.
110. Id: at 46-47.
111. ICNT, supra note 61, at 26-27, §4, art. 152, 153.

19781

Marine Minerals

One provision notably absent from the ICNT is a "grandfather
clause." Such a clause would provide minimal protection for those
engaged in mining prior to the effective date of the treaty. Without
the clause no company can be assured of access and therefore might
waste the money spent in developing technology. Thus, such a
clause is considered indispensible for United States agreement to
any treaty."'
The concern over these deficiencies is based on the underlying
assumption that the developing countries will seek to profit at the
expense of those who provide the technology. This assumption is
supported by portions of a mild-mannered address delivered to the
United States House of Representatives by Paul B. Engo, representative of the African Comeroon Republic and Chariman of Committee I.
The growth of new ideas of meaningful justice and national progress for all; the institutions, political, social, and economic that
have evolved from the American experience these have provided
revolutionary models for peaceful evolutions in many lands near
and far.
I have chosen to refer to these facts because it is in their light that
one expects the Government and people of the United States to be
more receptive to revolutionary ideas and changes than most of the
other world. Sometimes the knowledge of your great achievements
in many fields in only two centuries, tempts most people to expect
more benevolent leadership than you can in all reality afford. You
get criticized because many expect so much of so comparatively
young a nation.113
To partially counteract the risks presently inherent in seabed
mining, international consortia have been formed.' The consortia,
akin to joint ventures, allow individual companies of various nations
to pool their resources during the developmental stages of seabed
mining. The companies thereby share the benefits of research while
spreading the risk of economic loss which may result from current
112. Breaux, supra note 48, at 6-7; Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 452-53.
113. 123 CONG. REc. #119, E4468 (June 20, 1977).
114. Companies actively pursuing ocean mining at the present are mainly members of one
of the four international consortia: (1) the Deepsea Ventures group, composed of U.S. Steel,
Union Miniere of Belgium, and Deepsea Ventures; (2) the International Nickel group, composed of AMR-Metallgesellschaft Preussag, Domco-Sumitomo (and other Japanese firms),
Inco Ltd. and Sedco Inc.; (3) the Kennecott Copper group, composed of Rio Tinto Zinc and
Consolidated Gold Mines of Great Britain, Normanda Mines of Canada, Mitushibi of Japan,
and Kennecott Copper Corp.; and (4) Lockheed Missiles and Space Co. which is forming a
consortia with Amoco Minerals and Billiton International Minerals (Royal/Dutch Shell).
Statham, supra note 1, at 16-17; Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 196-97, 285, 325; Welling,
supra note 98, at 50-51.
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legal uncertainties. However, the risk-spreading ability of consortia
is of diminishing utility as the companies prepare for full-scale operations and the sizu of investments necessarily increases.
UNILATERAL ACTION-DOMESTIC LEGISLATION

Legislation supporting unilateral action has been introduced in
Congress in response to the stagnant treaty negotiations. The legislation is intended to provide a climate of legal security so that the
development of seabed mining will not be further inhibited." 5 It is
not intended to be a complete alternative to an international agreement." Whether or not it accomplishes these purposes, it is likely
that the legislation will be enacted by this session of Congress." 7 Its
support is premised upon the strategic importance of the minerals
as well as their potential contribution to the elimination of the
growing trade deficit."' A few lobbyists urge enactment of these
bills, H.R. 3350 and S. 2053, to preserve the environment from the
detrimental effects of mining in the absence of comprehensive
guidelines." 9 An examination of specific sections of the legislation
demonstrates that these goals may not be realized.
The Environment
A belief that the mining companies are likely to begin mining
with or without either a treaty or domestic legislation is the foundation of environmentalist support of unilateral action. If insufficient
attention is given to the environment at the developmental stage,
it may be necessary for industry to retrofit its equipment to comply
with later regulation. 120 Environmental damage could occur in the
interim. The principal danger now envisioned is that suction lifts
will carry sediment and "near-bottom" water to the surface, unless
equipment is designed to discharge these elements at an earlier
point.' 2' The colder and denser near-bottom water could harm aniH.R. 3350, 95th Cong. 1st Sess., § 2a)10 [hereinafter: H.R. 3350; H.R. REP. No. 588, supra
note 5, at 10, 49; S. 2053, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., §2a) 10 (1977) [hereinafter cited as S.2053].
116. Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 193, 210, 274-75, 345-48; Statham, supra note 1, at
5.
117. Correspondence with Judy Townsend, professional staff of the Subcommittee on
Oceanography, Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives,
(Oct. 27, 1977 on file) [hereinafter cited as Townsend Correspondence]. S. 2053 and H.R.
3350 are almost identical, except for the antitrust provision of S. 2053. H.R. 3350, supra note
115; S. 2053, supra note 115, §103 d).
118. See text accompanying notes 87-90, supra.
119. R.A. FRANK, DEEPSEA MINING AND THE ENVIRONMENT 34 (1976); [hereinafter cited as
FRANK] Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 136; 123 CONG. REC. #135 pt. II, S13980.
120. SEA TECHNOLOGY 25 (Aug. 1976) Breaux, supra note 48, at 7, 8; FRANK, supra note
119, at 34.
121. FRANK, supra note 119, at 15 (1976).
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mal life. However, the greatest danger is presented by sediment,
which can take as long as five years to descend one hundred yards,
thereby causing disruption in photosynthesis and the food chain."'
The executive branch will have the responsibility of assessing
environmental impact through the preparation of programmatic
impact statements.'23 Further, issuance of a license for seabed mining is considered a major federal action for purposes of the Environmental Policy Act of 1969,124 and may require an impact statement
particularized to the proposed operation. The Secretary of Commerce will control the two-tiered authorization of activities on the
seabed.' 25 The first tier is the license, which allows the holder to
engage in exploration.' 6 The second tier is the permit, which authorizes the taking of substantial quantities of minerals from the
seabed for the purpose of marketing those minerals.'27 In granting a
license or a permit, terms and conditions are to be specified for the
protection of the environment.2 8 Additionally, modification of licenses or permits may occur if necessary for protection, and if the
potential injury to the environment outweighs both the national
interest in obtaining minerals and the burden of economic loss.'2
The Secretary of Commerce can immediately suspend a license and
halt activities, if it is determined such emergency measures are
needed to prevent a significant adverse effect upon the environment.' 3 Finally, the Secretary is granted rule-making authority to
effectuate the purposes of the Act.'
Environmentalists do not feel that the rule-making authority is
sufficiently connected with the environmental portions of the legislation.' 3 The grant is contained in sections of the bills not related
122. Id. at 15, 16.
123. The House bill requires the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies to prepare such statements with special attention to the areas wherein development is likely to occur first. H.R.
3350, supra note 115, §105. The Senate bill requires the Secretaries of the Interior and
Commerce, acting through the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, to prepare such statements. S. 2053, supra note 115, § 109c).
124. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 §§ 1, 102, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4332 (1970).
125. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 103a) et seq.; S. 2053, supra note 115, § 102a) et seq.
126. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 3(5); S. 2053, supra note 155, § 6(4).
127. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 3(1); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 6(1).
128. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 106b)(9); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 109b).
129. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 103 i)(1), (2); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 105b) (1).
130. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 104c); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 106 c).
131. The House version has a general grant of rule-making power, with subsequent grants
of power to make rules and regulations in regard to specific substantive and procedural
matters, but not including the environment. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 106 a). The Senate
version seems to allow for more specific environmental regulation though it is not mentioned
as such. S. 2053, supra note 115, § 401 c).
132. Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 138-40.
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to the environment. They also believe that specific provisions allowing regulation of the amount of discharge are needed.133 The balancing test for modification appears to be weighted against the environment from the start, as the environmental injury must outweigh
both the national interest in the minerals, and the burden of economic loss. This is a difficult standard to meet, particularly when
one recalls that a major justification for enacting the legislation is
the national interest in the minerals.
Processing of Minerals
Another important provision of the legislation requires permitees
to process all minerals within the United States. 3 4 The bill provides
an escape clause which allows processing outside the United States
with the permission of the Secretary. 135 The Secretary of Commerce
must determine that foreign processing is necessary for the economic viability of the operation and must be satisfactorily assured
that the processed minerals will be returned to the United States if
the national interest so demands. 3 ' This provision is crucial to elimination of the trade deficit. Processing accounts for an estimated one
half of the cost of these minerals.137 If the United States permittee
was allowed to underwrite the construction and operation of a foreign processing facility the dollars would flow the wrong way.
The present Secretary of Commerce and Ambassador Richardson
oppose the requirement of domestic processing due to the international character of the consortia.131 The restriction may irritate developed countries whose nationals participate in the consortia.
Deepsea Ventures, Inc. supports the provision, recognizing the desirability of strategic control. 39 However, this is not the position of
companies with international partners.4 0 The countries of those
partners, like the United States, have a legitimate interest in securing an independent supply of those minerals. Strategic control and
balance of payments are as vital to them as to the United States.
Additionally, buying nodule minerals from the United States would
result in higher transportation and labor costs. However, as support
for this legislation is based on the balance of trade and strategic
133. Id. at 462-63 (testimony of John Rhett, Sp. Ass't. Admin. for Water Operations
Program, E.P.A.).
134. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 103 c)(3); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 102 c)(3).
135. Id.
136. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 103 c)(3)A)B); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 102 c)(3)A)B).
137. See text accompanying note 110, supra.
138. Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 475.
139. Id. at 328 (testimony of J. Flipse, president of Deepsea Ventures, Inc.).
140. Statham, supra note 1, at 17, 18.
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needs, it would be irrational and counterproductive to exclude the
provision. A regulation requiring that a proportion of the minerals
be processed within the United States may be a necessary compromise.
Licensing Specific Sites
Sections of the legislation beneficial to all business interests provide for the licensing of a specific area within which a company may
operate. The Secretary of Commerce is to specify the size of the
area,14 1 sufficient to satisfy a permittee's production requirements
and to allow intensive exploration.' Filing an application for a
specific site establishes priority for licenses,'4 ' and only the licensee
may procure a permit.' The Secretary may not issue a license or
permit for an area covered by an equivalent authorization from a
reciprocating State.'45 The president may designate reciprocating
States where he finds the State regulates the development of the
seabed in a manner comparable to the United States.'46
Delineation of the area within which activity will be allowed is
considered a necessity by the industrial community. In support of
this contention, industry cites the cost of fully exploring a specific
area, the need to know the exact location of deposits, and the dependence of processing upon the consistency of ore composition.'47
Furthermore, priority and exclusivity of site are essential to obtain
the necessary financing. " 8 The environmentalists concur on the
need for specificity. Variations in geology and topography dictate a
more thorough analysis than is possible in generalized studies,' 4
particularly if the results are to be incorporated as conditions to a
license or permit.
141. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 106 b)(1); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 107 a)(1)A)B).
142. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 106 b)(1)A)(i)(ii); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 107
a)(1)A)B).
143. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 101 b(1)(2), 103 c)(1)E)e); S. 2053, supra note 115, §
102 c)(1)E), 101 b)(1)(2), 103 b).
144. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 103 c)91)E); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 102 c)(1)B).
145. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 103 c)(1)E); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 103 c)(1)E).
146. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 108; S. 2053, supra note 115, § 116.
147. Serial 95-4, supra note 1, at 207, 275; Milton Stem, Vice President of Kennecott
Copper Corp. testified that the calculations needed to determine the productivity of mining
must be based upon data from a specific site. Id at 357-58.
148. H.R. REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 20-21; Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 56-57.
C.T. Houseman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, testified that in determining whether or not
to finance a particular operation, a bank would have to calculate the likely productivity
within a specific area to determine whether there was adequate security for their investment.
Id. at 76-77, 172; Id. at 193-94.
149. Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 140, 145-46 (testimony of R. Frank on behalf of the
Environmental Defense Fund, The Friends of the Earth, The National Audubon Society, The
Natural Resources Defense Council and the Sierra Club).
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Critics claim licensing specific sites is tantamount to a subdivision of the ocean by the government. One Congressman has asserted
it could be viewed as a form of imperialism. 150 Ambassador Richardson suggests the licensing of a "plan of work," rather than a specific
area may be more appropriate in light of international committments.51 Such a plan would include a description of the techniques
to be used and the area to be mined. If no more than a nominal
difference, such a suggestion would fail to accomodate environmental or financial needs. Any description more generalized than that
contemplated by the bills would not provide a basis for determining
the appropriate protective conditions to be imposed upon the licensee; nor would financial institutions feel they were adequately secured due to the inability to predict the annual payload of their
borrower.
Investment Compensation
Controversy over unilateral legislation is magnified by sections
which provide for compensation of the mining entities if international agreement results in a diminution in value of their investment.5 2 The compensable investment must have been made after
the effective date of the Act, and does not include funds invested
for the research, development, or evaluation of the technology, nor
15
any potential value of the mineral resources. '
In addition to limitation on types of investments, restrictions are
placed on which entities may qualify. The entity must be operating
under a permit issued before the effective date of an international
agreement, and the international agreement must result in a voiding of the license or permit, or in the imposition of substantially
different terms. 5 ' Permittees must have been operating for less than
ten years. 5 The claimant must also have elected to pay an annual
compensation premium.
Comparable to an insurance premium, the proceeds of this premium would go into a compensation fund from which disbursements
would be made. On a "minimal" investment of $500,000,000, the
annual premium could vary between $3,750,000 and $1,250,000.111
An election not to pay the premium is irrevocable.'57 The maximum
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 31-32 (testimony of Representative Don Fraser).
Id. at 447.
H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 202 b); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 202 b).
H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 202 a); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 202 a).
H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 202 c); S. 2053, supra note 115 § 202 c).
H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 202 c)(1)D)2); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 202 c)(1)D)2).
H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 202 h)(2)B); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 203 b)(2).
H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 202 h)(2)A); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 203 b).
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compensation available to the mining entity would be the lesser of
ninety percent of the investment or three hundred and fifty million
dollars.15 Subject to set off for the salvage value of assets directly
related to mining, plus any after tax revenue earned through the
mining activities.'5 9 Losses insurable through customary channels
are also excluded.' 60
Although at first glance the compensation provision might appear
to be an insurance policy, the stringency of the limitations, particularly those relating to a set off for revenues, indicate a more limited
scope. Only those losses which cannot be compensated in any other
way are covered. These provisions have been strongly criticized as
special interest legislation, serving the interests of the mining community at the expense of the taxpayer.' That criticism must be
conceded. The government does not normally guarantee any type of
investment, particularly in a new and somewhat speculative industry.
It is arguable, however, that these protections are necessary to
provide security and stimulate investment in ocean mining. The
increasingly low level of liquidity in the mining industry is responsible in part for the need of investment protection. Diminishing returns on land-based operations and the lack of internal investment
funds has necessitated outside investment before full-scale development can begin.' 2 Outside investors are unwilling to let their security ride the waves of the current international negotiations. ' Commercial insurance to cover this type of political risk is nonexistent.' 4
It has been suggested that the Overseas Private Investment Corporation ought to cover such a risk. As a quasi-governmental body,
established by the United States, OPIC facilitates investment in
under-developed countries through insuring political risks such as
inconvertible currency, expropriation, and war. It finances projects
through direct loans and guarantees. However, OPIC's statutory
authority precludes insuring operations in international waters. '
158. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 202 e)(1); S. 2053, supra note 115 § 202 e)1).
159. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 202 e)(2); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 202 e)(2).
160. H. R. 3350, supra note 115, § 202 e)(3); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 202 e)(3).
161. 123 CONG. REc. #109, E4025.
162. See Ocean Mining Systems, supra note 397, at 2.
163. H.R. REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 19; Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 193-94, 17071, 209-10, 213, 349, 536-37.
164. Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 170-71, 330-31, 374, 378. The impossibility of assessing risks of a future event contingent upon the consent of 150 nations, and establishing a
corresponding premium is the reason for the unavailability of insurance. Id. at 381-82.
165. H.R. REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 20.
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Therefore, legislatively authorized compensation is the only protection available.
Opponents maintain the potential cost of this compensation provision cannot be justified in terms of the national interest.' The
portion of the annual trade deficit attributable to nodule metals
would be exceeded by five claims for the maximum statutory compensation. 7 Such arguments, however, ignore the intensity of the
national interest, strategic or otherwise, in assuring a source of these
minerals. Due to the size of investments, diminishing the amount
of the compensation would not comport with financial realities.
It is also asserted that investment protection is unnecessary as
grandfather rights can be assured in the treaty.'68 That assertion
ignores the current progress of the negotiations and does little to
encourage development. Furthermore, the legislation would provide
compensation only in the event that grandfather rights were not
included in the treaty. If they were included, no loss would occur
as a result of an international agreement within the terms of the
legislation.
A compromise limiting investment protection to the proportion of
national benefits derived from mining would be acceptable to industry and to the financiers.'6 9 Adequate security would be provided as
the proportion of national benefits would most likely be directly
related to the proportion of American investment. However, it is
likely that the legislation will be passed without adequate guarantees. The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs reported
the bill favorably, but deleted the investment guarantee.' 7 ° The
Carter Administration has approved the legislation, but opposes the
guarantee.' If support of the legislation stems from a desire to
encourage mining, it is inconsistent to delete the investment protection clause. It may be, however, that support is premised upon a
desire to stimulate the international negotiations through decisive
action, rather than upon a desire to encourage mining.
THE PROPRIETY OF UNILATERAL ACTION

Whether or not domestic legislation is an appropriate means of
prodding the international community into an agreement, that ra166. Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 32-35 (Fraser), 447 (Eliott Richardson), 474-75
(Juanita Kreps).
167. See text accompanying notes 87-90, supra.
168. Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 112-13, 447, 474-75.
169. Statham, supra note 1, at 18.
170. Townsend correspondence, supra note 117.
171. Wall St. J., Oct. 19,, 1977, at 12, col. 2, 3.
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tionale underlies much of the support given to the bills. "2 Regardless of its efficacy for that purpose, there is support for the contention that certain provisions constitute an improper exercise of sovereignty.
The unilateral legislation disclaims any sovereignty over the areas
of the seabed. 73' However, the exercise of certain rights, no matter
how characterized, can result in a de facto exercise of sovereignty.,',
The authorization of mining lends official approval to the appropriation of specific areas of the seabed by United States nationals. The
nature of seabed mining will necessarily preclude others from enjoying those same rights, as the first enjoyment will be the last. A
government supporting this activity through investment guarantees
might be regarded as a silent partner in such a mining endeavor.
Requiring the minerals to be brought within the government's territorial control elevates the level of involvement, particularly in light
of the official recognition of the legitimacy of the operation. This
beneficial interest, together with the necessarily exclusive nature of
mining, the authorization of activities, and the control over licensing, constitutes an exercise of de facto sovereignty over the seabed
by the United States.
Indeed, some legislators realize the legislation could be viewed as
a territorial grant by the United States.' A plausible hypothetical
could include a foreign mining boat, accompanied by a foreign gun
boat, in confrontation with a United States mining operation. Congressmen McCloskey and Fraser assert that the use of force in protection of mining claims should be considered a real possibility if
this legislation is enacted.' 5
Another indication of the improper assertion of sovereignty is the
licensing provision of this legislation. American law regards a license as the grant of an interest in land. The grant includes the
privilege of using land which is in the possession of another, the
licensor.'7 7 The licensor has the privilege of granting licenses, and
retains control over the subject land during the entire term of the
license.' The license entitles the licensee to do acts which would
172. Breaux, supra note 48, at 5; H.R. REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 30; United States
Policies,supra note 85, at 643; Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 51-52, 424-25; 123 CONG. REC.
#135 pt.II, S13981.
173. H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 101 1)2); S. 2053, supra note 115, § 5 1)2).
174. The validity of the assertion of jurisdiction by a state, through the attachment of
legal consequences to the conduct of its nationals in other countries, is well established.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 36, § 30.
175. Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 474; H.R. REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 67.
176. H.R. REP. No. 588, -supra note 5, at 72; Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 41.
177. 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.110 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
178. Id. § 8.111.
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normally be an interference with the rights of the licensor. 7 , Such
an interference by one not holding a license would usually be a
trespass. It is not unreasonable to infer that one who licenses activities in a specific area, implicitly asserts possessory rights over that
area. When a government asserts possessory rights over a parcel of
land it is typically called an assertion of sovereignty.
Proponents of the legislation will argue that the doctrine of res
nullius allows individuals to mine, and that the government is exercising jurisdiction only over the person of its nationals. 180 However,
the inapplicability of res nullius and the peculiar nature of the
nodules demonstrate the fallacy of that claim. 8' It also demonstrates the weakness of the claim that the government is exercising
jurisdiction only over its nationals.
Opponents of the legislation take the position that the status of
the seabed is controlled by the declaration that the seabed is the
"common heritage of mankind" and that this, in itself, prohibits
this legislation.'8 2 The United States has maintained, however, that
this principle does not create a rule of common property over the
seabed.'83 Analysis of "the common heritage of mankind" may reveal the proper treatment to be accorded the seabed.
Application of the ancient principle of res communes would give
the seabed the status of common property. 8" Interpretation of "the
common heritage of mankind" supports that suggestion.
The word common suggests a thing shared in respect of use or
enjoyment, without apportionment or division into individual
parts. The word heritage suggests property or interests which are
reserved to a person by reason of birth. . . .Mankind refers to the
collective group whereas man refers to individual men or women.' 85
One might conclude that the phrase connotes worldwide common
ownership of the seabed and its resources. 8 ' The developing countries are not the only countries supporting such an interpretation.
Both the Spanish and French texts of Resolution 2749 use a word
which relates to common property.' 87 From this "ordinary meaning"
179. Id. § 8.109. In the case of public rights it seems appropiate to consider the authority
as a trustee in whom the rights are vested for the benefit of the general public.
180. H.R. REP. No. 588, supra note 5, at 24.
181. See text accompanying notes 48-56 supra.
182. Serial No. 95-4, supra note 1, at 182, 399-400.
183. Grotius Revisited, supra note 7, at 280.
184. See text accompanying notes 49-56, supra.
185. Arnold, The Common Heritageof Mankind as a Legal Concept, 9 INT'L LAW. 153-54
(1975).
186. Id.
187. Grotius Revisited, supra note 7, at 280.
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interpretation and the unanimity supporting the Resolution, one
could surmise that the common property approach toward the
seabed qualifies as a customary principle of international law. 8'
Accepting this interpretation, application of principles of American property law under the Statute of Anne would permit any coowner of the seabed to possess and use it as he chooses.'89 The
Statute of Anne, as originally enacted, required the co-owner to
account for profits from rentals, but not for his own productive use
of the land.8 0 The Statute was adopted in the United States with
the modification that the co-owner must account to the other owners for profits received from any use resulting in a reduction in value
of the property.'
Under these principles, the "common heritage" doctrine could
permit the immediate authorization of mining by any "co-member"
of the world community. Any country authorizing mining would be
required, at a minimum, to account to co-members for any profits,
as the value of the seabed would be diminished. The proposed domestic legislation does provide for the establishment of an international fund financed by mandatory contributions from seabed miners that would be used for payments to the international community." 2 The provision for the international fund is a tacit acknowledgement that the seabed is common property. Unfortunately, the provision is deficient in providing for sharing pursuant
only to a future international agreement."' If no international agreement is reached no sharing will occur pursuant to the legislation.
Consistency and honesty mandate sharing with the international
community from the inception of mining.
CONCLUSION

Development of the technological ability to exploit the resources
of the sea poses no serious problem if the restraints inhibiting mining investment are removed. Distribution of the nodule minerals
among the nations of the world presents the most difficulty. If access to these minerals is unduly restricted to ensure the participation of developing countries, industry may opt not to proceed with
development. On the other hand, industry cannot be given a carte
blanche, for this threatens the equality in enjoyment of ocean re188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See text accompanying note 56-58, supra.
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.14 (A.J. Casner ed. 1952).
Id.
Id.; 2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.14 (A.J. Casner ed. Supp. 1977).
H.R. 3350, supra note 115, § 203; S. 2053, supra note 115, § 204.
Id.
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sources. The accelerating "resource crunch," coupled with anticipation of the potential benefits to be derived from the sea, may prompt
hasty and irrational decisions. Both the overly burdensome terms
of the ICNT, and the self-serving provisions of the proposed domestic legislation, are examples of solutions which lack the balance
needed to avoid unnecessary and unproductive conflicts.
Such conflicts can be avoided only by assuring that the character
of the resources is respected in any plan for exploitation. As the
mineral resources lie outside the jurisdiction of any sovereignty, the
proper characterization of these minerals can be gleaned only by
reference to the opinion of the international community. The world
community has essentially two choices. It may characterize the
minerals either as res nullius, or as common property.
The world community has expressed its opinion in Resolution
2749 and in the continuing negotiations, that the minerals are to be
regarded as the common property of mankind. It must be emphasized that the opinion of the international community exists apart
from its formal expression in Resolution 2749. The opinion preexisted the Resolution; indeed, the Resolution would not have
passed if the opinion did not already exist. Therefore the continued
vitality of that opinion does not depend upon the existence or the
interpretation of Resolution 2749.
Besides formally expressing the world community's opinion, Resolution 2749 was the written memorial of an international agreement whereby the parties committed themselves to development of
the ocean's resources through an international organization. The
"good faith obligation" to give effect to the terms of that agreement
necessitate that no party to the agreement proceed with development prior to, or apart from, the international organization to be
established. It is important to distinguish this obligation, which is
totally dependent upon the continued legal effect of that international agreement, from the opinion of the international community
as to the character of the resources, which was merely expressed in
the resolutions.
The commitment by all parties to a functional international organization is the keystone to rational development of the ocean. The
developing countries'must realize that the obligation of the United
States is not unconditional. The commitment to development
through an international entity is contingent upon the recognition
of the legitimate interests of this country and its citizens.
The parties to the international agreement embodied in Resolution 2749 may have mutually breached that agreement. The developing countries probably have committed a breach by their lack of
good faith and inflexibility in trying to implement the terms of the
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agreement. Such a breach would release the United States from its
obligation to refrain from development until the establishment of an
international organization. However, a breach of the international
agreement does not alter the international community's characterization of the resources as common property. There has been no
indication of any change in the opinion expressed in Resolution
2749. Any development of the seabed must be in keeping with this
character.
Therefore, unilateral action can be justified only in so far as it
respects the character of the ocean resources and provides for an
equitable sharing of the benefits derived from ocean mining. As the
proposed domestic legislation provides for a sharing only in the
event of an international treaty it is grossly deficient.
The current progress in international negotiations suggests that
ocean development is likely to occur through unilateral, rather than
consolidated actions. Those taking unilateral action must be particularly careful to respect the rights of others. The United States must
be particularly careful as the other developed nations are watching
its actions closely to take their cue. Should its actions meet with
criticism, the other nations are not likely to support the United
States at the risk of alienating the underdeveloped countries. Instead, they probably will justify their actions as an attempt to keep
the United States from appropriating all the resources.
The most serious ramifications of the decisions regarding manganese nodules will not be realized until years after those decisions
are made. The ultimate methods of exploitation, and the tenor of
further international negotiations will have great precedential value
with respect to the distribution of the resources of what have heretofore been considered "no-man's lands.'

' 94

The exploitation of Antartica will be the first application of the
model established by ocean mining.'95 When full-scale exploitation
of Antartica begins, the last of the earth's great mineral reserves will
start to dwindle, as will the last great untapped source of food. The
importance of developing a rational method for distributing these
194.

Cocca, Principlesfor a Declarationwith Reference to the Legal Nature of the Moon,

SPACE LAW PERSPECTIVES 16 (1976); Bus INT'L 313 (Oct. 7, 1977); 123 CONG. REC. #125, S12675.

195. There is a treaty which seeks to insulate Antartica from claims of sovereignty. However, there are few guidelines within that treaty which deal explicitly with resource explotation. Antartica Treaty, done Dec. 1, 1959 12 U.S.T. 791, T.I.A.S. No. 4780 (entered into force
for the U.S. June 23, 1961).
The problem of a lack of guidelines is accentuated by the possibility of oil exceeding the
deposits lying off the coast of Alaska. Manchester Guardian Weekly/The Washington Post,
Oct. 2, 1977, at 15, 16, col. 1. Millions of tons of krill, a crustacean, which promises to double
the world's supply of fish, may prompt commercial exploitation even sooner. Id.
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resources upon which many nations will depend is undeniable. The
United States has become keenly aware of the interdependence of
nations with regard to natural resources. Hopefully, it will not seek
to fill short term needs at the expense of relations with the other
nations of the world. Beyond these terrestial impacts, one must also
consider the likelihood that the manner of development of the ocean
and Antartica will greatly effect the way in which man exploits the
celestial bodies of outer space.' None of the parties to the current
negotiations are acting in a manner welcome as a precedent for the
future. The underdeveloped countries expect to reap a disproportionate harvest from the bottom of the ocean. Recognizing this imbalanced approach, the United States has responded with unilateral
action aimed at assuring that its nationals participate in seabed
development. It has failed to insure the right of the other nations of
the world to share in that development. Such singlemindedness
must be discarded. There may come the day when some other country holds the combination to Davy Jones's locker.
J.

KEVIN MCCALL

196. Echoing some of the language of Resolution 2749, the treaty governing the use of
outer space declares that outer space is the province of all mankind, and that no state shall
exercise sovereignty over any part of space or the celestial bodies. Treaties on Principles
Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, done Jan. 27, 1967 18 U.S.T. 2412, T.I.A.S. No. 6347
(entered into force for the U.S. Oct. 10, 1967). Those scholars concerned with this area of the
law have been advocating the creation of an international authority to deal with the problem
of allocating resources. Activities on Celestial Bodies Including the Exploitation of Natural
Resources, SPACE LAw PESPzCTiVEs, 223-25 (1976).
One of the more unique resources which space has to offer is the geostationary orbit, which
is the orbit located above the equator and approximately 221,300 miles from the surface of
the earth. The particular attraction of this orbit is that a satellite within it will be stationary
relative to a point on earth. The countries with space technology are concerned that the orbit
will become too "glutted" with the satellites of the space powers as the "orbit" can only
accommodate a finite number of satellites. 6 INT'L LAw NEws 1, 5 (April 1977).
197. In July of 1978 the House of Representatives passed H.R. 3350. The Senate version
of the bill is still in committee.

